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Abstract
This paper studies initial-value privacy problems of linear dynamical systems. We consider a stan-
dard linear time-invariant system with random process and measurement noises. For such a system,
eavesdroppers having access to system output trajectories may infer the system initial states, leading to
initial-value privacy risks. When a finite number of output trajectories are eavesdropped, we consider a
requirement that any guess about the initial values can be plausibly denied. When an infinite number
of output trajectories are eavesdropped, we consider a requirement that the initial values should not
be uniquely recoverable. In view of these two privacy requirements, we define differential initial-value
privacy and intrinsic initial-value privacy, respectively, for the system as metrics of privacy risks. First
of all, we prove that the intrinsic initial-value privacy is equivalent to unobservability, while the differ-
ential initial-value privacy can be achieved for a privacy budget depending on an extended observability
matrix of the system and the covariance of the noises. Next, the inherent network nature of the con-
sidered linear system is explored, where each individual state corresponds to a node and the state and
output matrices induce interaction and sensing graphs, leading to a network system. Under this network
system perspective, we allow the initial states at some nodes to be public, and investigate the resulting
intrinsic initial-value privacy of each individual node. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions
for such individual node initial-value privacy, and also prove that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of
individual nodes is generically determined by the network structure. These results may be extended to
linear systems with time-varying dynamics under the same analysis framework.
1 Introduction
The rapid developments in networked control systems [1], internet of things [2, 3], smart grids [4], intelli-
gent transportation [5, 6] during the past decade shed lights on how future infrastructures of our society
can be made smart via interconnected sensing, dynamics, and control over cyber-physical systems. The
operation of such systems inherently relies on users and subsystems sharing signals such as measurements,
dynamical states, control inputs in their local views, so that collective decisions become possible. The
shared signals might directly contain sensitive information of a private nature, e.g., loads and currents in
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a grid reflect directly activities in a residence or productions in a company [7]; or they might indirectly
encode physical parameters, user preferences, economic inclination, e.g., control inputs in economic model
predictive control implicitly carry information about the system’s economic objective as it is used as the
objective function [8].
Several privacy metrics have been developed to address privacy expectations of dynamical systems. A
notable metric is differential privacy, which originated in computer science [9–11]. When a mechanism
is applied taking the sensitive information as input and producing an output as the learning outcome,
differential privacy guarantees plausible deniability of any inference about the private information by
eavesdroppers having access to the output. Differential privacy has become the canonical solutions for
privacy risk characterization in dataset processing, due to its quantitative nature and robustness to post-
processing and side information [10, 11]. The differential privacy framework has also been generalized to
dynamical systems for problems ranging from average consensus seeking [12] and distributed optimization
[13,14] to estimation and filtering [7,15] and feedback control [16,17]. Consistent with its root, differential
privacy for a dynamical system provides the system with the ability to have plausible deniability facing
eavesdroppers, e.g., recent surveys in [18,19].
Besides differential privacy, another related but different privacy risk lies in the possibility that an
eavesdropper makes an accurate enough estimation of the sensitive parameters or signals, perhaps from a
number of repeated observations. In [20], the variance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimation was
utilized to measure how accurate the initial node states in a consensus network maybe estimated from the
trajectories of one or more malicious nodes. In [21], a measure of privacy was developed using the inverse
of the trace of the Fisher information matrix, which is a lower bound of the variance of estimation error
of unbiased estimators.
In particular, initial values of a dynamical system may carry sensitive private information, leading
to privacy risks related to the initial values. For instance, when distributed load shedding in micro-
grid systems is performed by employing an average consensus dynamics, initial values represent load
demands of individual users [22]. In [12, 20], the initial-value privacy of the average consensus algorithm
over dynamical networks was studied, and injecting exponentially decaying noises was used as a privacy-
protection approach. The privacy of the initial value for a dynamical system is also of significant theoretical
interest as the system trajectories or distributions of the system trajectories are fully parametrized by the
initial value, in the presence of the plant knowledge. In [21], the initial-value privacy of a linear system
was studied, and an optimal privacy-preserving policy was established for the probability density function
of the additive noise such that the balance between the Fisher information-based privacy level and output
performance is achieved.
In this paper, we study initial-value privacy problems of linear dynamical systems in the presence of
random process and sensor noises. For such a system, eavesdroppers having access to system output tra-
jectories may infer the system initial states. When a finite number of output trajectories are eavesdropped,
we consider a requirement that any guess about the initial values can be plausibly denied. When an infinite
number of output trajectories are eavesdropped, we consider a requirement that the initial values should
not be uniquely recoverable. These requirements inspire us to define and investigate two initial-value pri-
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vacy metrics for the considered linear system: differential initial-value privacy on the plausible deniability,
and intrinsic initial-value privacy on the fundamental non-identifiability. Next, we turn to the inherent
network nature of linear systems, where each dimension of the system state corresponds to a node, and
the state and output matrices induce interaction and sensing graphs. In the presence of malicious users
or additional observations, the initial states at a subset of the nodes may be known to the eavesdroppers
as well. With such a public disclosure set, the intrinsic initial-value privacy of each individual node, and
the structural privacy metric of the entire network, become interesting and challenging questions.
The main results of this paper are summarized in the following:
• For general linear systems, we prove that intrinsic initial-value privacy is equivalent to unobservabil-
ity; and that differential initial-value privacy can be achieved for a privacy budget depending on an
extended observability matrix of the system and the covariance of the noises.
• For networked linear systems, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for intrinsic initial-
value privacy of individual nodes, in the presence of a public disclosure set consisting of nodes with
known initial states. We also show that the network structure plays a generic role in determining
the privacy of each node’s initial value, and the maximally allowed number of arbitrary disclosed
nodes under privacy guarantee as a network privacy index.
These results may be extended to linear (network) systems with time-varying dynamics under the same
analysis framework. The network privacy as proven to be a generic structural property, is a generalization
to the classical structural observability results.
A preliminary version of the results is presented in [23] where the technical proofs, illustrative examples,
and many discussions were not included. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
formulates the problem of interest for linear dynamical systems. In Section 3, intrinsic initial-value privacy
and differential privacy are explicitly defined and studied by regarding all initial values as a whole. Then
regarding the system from the network system perspective, Section 4 analyzes the intrinsic initial-value
privacy of individual nodes with a public disclosure set and studies a quantitative network privacy index,
from exact and generic perspectives. Finally a brief conclusion is made in Section 5. All technical proofs
are presented in the Appendix.
Notations. We denote by R the real numbers and Rn the real space of n dimension for any positive integer
n. For a vector x ∈ Rn, the norm ‖x‖= (x>x) 12 . For any x1, . . . , xm ∈ Rn, we denote [x1; . . . ;xm] as a vector[
x>1 . . . x>m
]> ∈ Rmn, and [x1, . . . , xm] as a matrix of which the i-the column is xi, i = 1, . . . ,m. For any
square matrix A, let σ(A) denote the set of all eigenvalues of A, and σM (A), σm(A) denote the maximum
and minimum eigenvalues, respectively. For any matrix A ∈ Rn×m, the norm ‖A‖= σM (A>A) 12 . For any
set X ∈ Rn, we let 1X(x) be a characteristic function, satisfying 1X(x) = 1 for x ∈ X and 1X(x) = 0 for
x /∈ X. The range of a matrix or a function is denoted as range(·), and the span of a matrix is denoted as
span(·). We denote pdf(·) as the probability density function, and ei ∈ Rn as a vector whose entries are
all zero except the i-th being one.
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2 Problem Statement
2.1 Initial-Value Privacy for Linear Systems
We consider the following linear time-invariant (LTI) system
xt+1 = A xt + νt
yt = C xt + ωt
(1)
for t = 0, 1, . . ., where xt ∈ Rn is state, yt ∈ Rm is output, νt ∈ Rn is process noise, and ωt ∈ Rm is
measurement noise. Throughout this paper, we assume that νt and ωt are random variables according to
some zero-mean distributions, and rank (C) > 0.
In this paper, we suppose that initial values x0 are privacy-sensitive information for the system. Eaves-
droppers having access to the output trajectory (yt)
T
t=0 with T ≥ n−1 attempt to infer the private initial
values. To facilitate subsequent analysis, we denote the measurement vector Yt = [yT−t; yT−t+1; . . . ; yT ],
the noise vectors Vt = [νT−t;νT−t+1; . . . ;νT−1] and Wt = [ωT−t;ωT−t+1; . . . ;ωT ], and let
Oob =

C
CA
...
CAn−1
 , Ot =

C
CA
...
CAt
 ,
Ht =

0 0 · · · 0 0
C 0
. . . 0 0
CA C
. . . 0 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
CAt−2 CAt−3
. . . C 0
CAt−1 CAt−2 · · · CA C

.
Here Oob is observability matrix, and Ot denotes extended observability matrix for t ≥ n and Ht is a
lower block triangular Toeplitz matrix. Thus, the mapping from initial state x0 to the output trajectory
YT as M : Rn → Rm(T+1) can be described by
YT = M(x0) := OTx0 + HTVT + WT . (2)
The system (1) may be implemented or run independently for multiple times with the same initial state
x0. When all resulting output trajectories are eavesdropped, the eavesdropper may derive an estimate of
x0 by statistical inference methods such as maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The resulting estimate
accuracy may converge to zero as the number of eavesdropped output trajectories converges to infinity,
leading to initial-value privacy risks. In view of this, we consider a requirement that
(R1) the initial values should not be uniquely recoverable by an eavesdropper having an infinite number
of output trajectories.
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To address the requirement (R1), we define intrinsic initial-value privacy as below.
Definition 1 The system (1) preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy if the initial state x0 is statistically
non-identifiable from observing (yt)
T
t=0, i.e., for any x0 ∈ Rn, there exists a x′0 6= x0 ∈ Rn such that
pdf (YT |x0) = pdf
(
YT |x′0
)
. (3)
In Definition 1, equality (3) indicates that there exist other values x′0, yielding the same output trajec-
tory distribution as that of the initial value x0. This in turn guarantees that the system preserving the
intrinsic initial-value privacy satisfies the requirement (R1).
Remark 1 The intrinsic initial-value privacy guarantees the initial state x0 indistinguishable from the
x′0 satisfying (3), which is related to the notion of undetectable attacks in the secure control literature,
e.g. [28], where the attacker tries to inject signals that are indistinguishable.
On the other hand, when a finite N output trajectories are eavesdropped, the eavesdroppers may infer
the initial values under which there is a probability of generating these output trajectories. In view of this,
we consider a requirement that
(R2) any inference about the true initial value from the eavesdroppers can be denied by supplying any
value within a range to the inference with a similar probability of generating the eavesdropped N
output trajectories.
This property is referred to as plausible deniability in the literature [27]. With this in mind, we denote
the eavesdropped output trajectories as Y1T , . . . ,Y
N
T . The mapping from initial state x0 to Y
1
T , . . . ,Y
N
T
is a concatenation of N mappings M(x0), i.e.,
Y1T
...
YNT
 = MN (x0) :=

M(x0)
...
M(x0)
 . (4)
We then define differential initial-value privacy as below [9,10].
Definition 2 We define two initial values x0,x
′
0 ∈ Rn as d-adjacent if ‖x0 − x′0‖≤ d. The system (1)
preserves (, δ)-differential privacy of initial values for some privacy budgets  > 0, 0.5 > δ > 0 under
d-adjacency if for all R ⊂ range(MN ),
P(MN (x0) ∈ R) ≤ e · P(MN (x′0) ∈ R) + δ (5)
holds for any two d-adjacent initial values x0,x
′
0 ∈ Rn.
In Definition 2, inequality (5) indicates that the system can plausibly deny any guess from the eavesdrop-
pers having N output trajectories, using any value from its d-adjacency. Namely, the system preserving
the differential initial-value privacy satisfies the requirement (R2).
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Remark 2 The requirement (R1) indeed can be understood from a perspective of denability. Namely,
(R1′) [Deniability from non-identifiability] any inference xˆ0 about the true initial value from the
eavesdroppers having an infinite number of output trajectories, can be denied by supplying any other
value x′0 satisfying
pdf (YT |xˆ0) = pdf
(
YT |x′0
)
. (6)
Note that the derivation of such x′0 needs extra computation such that (6) is fulfilled and the resulting
x′0 may be very close to or far away from the inference xˆ0. In contrast, the x′0 used to deny xˆ0 in (R2)
is arbitrarily selected within a range to xˆ0. In view of this, the plausible deniability in (R2) provides the
system with a more convenient denial mechanism. On the other hand, it can be seen that (6) indicates that
(5) holds with (, δ) = (0, 0), yielding that the eavesdroppers cannot distinguish between xˆ0 and x
′
0 with
probability one. The above analysis thus demonstrates that intrinsic initial-value privacy and differential
initial-value privacy are not inclusive mutually.
2.2 An Illustrative Example
In this subsection, an illustrative example is presented to demonstrate the relation and practical difference
between the above two types of privacy metrics.
Example 1. Consider system (1) with A =
[
0 1
0 −1
]
and let T = 1 and the private initial states
x0 = [x1,0;x2,0] = [2; 1]. Let νt v N(0, σ21I2) and ωt v N(0, σ22).
(a) Let output yt = C1xt with C1 =
[
1 1
]
, and σ2 = 0. We then obtain that
y0 = x1,0 + x2,0 ,
y1 =
[
1 1
]
ν0 .
For system with the output in Case (a), it is clear that pdf (YT |x0) = pdf (YT |x′0) for all x′0 = [x′1,0;x′2,0]
satisfying x′1,0 + x′2,0 = x1,0 + x2,0. This indicates that intrinsic initial-value privacy is preserved.
Regarding the differential privacy of initial values, we observe that y0 is deterministic. By choosing any
x′0 from 1-adjacency of x0 such that x′1,0 + x′2,0 6= x1,0 + x2,0, the inequality (5) is not satisfied for any
 > 0, 0.5 > δ > 0, which implies that the system does not preserve the differential privacy.
(b) Let output yt = C2xt with C2 =
[
1 0
]
, and σ1 = σ2 = 1. We then obtain that
y0 = x1,0 + ω0 ,
y1 = x2,0 +
[
1 0
]
ν0 + ω1 .
If an infinite number of output trajectories were eavesdropped, then the eavesdroppers could obtain the
expectations of y0,y1, denoted by E(y0),E(y1). The initial values x1,0, x2,0 then can be uniquely recovered
by x1,0 = E(y0) and x2,0 = E(y1), leading to loss of intrinsic initial-value privacy. Though it is impossible
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to eavesdrop an infinite number of output trajectories, we note that the eavesdroppers may obtain a
large number of output trajectories, by which the initial values can be accurately inferred. To address
this issue, we realize the system for 104 times and use the MLE method. The resulting estimate of x0 is
[2.0038; 0.9920], leading to loss of the intrinsic initial-value privacy as well. In view of this, the privacy
requirement (R1) and Definition 1 are of practical significance.
Regarding the differential privacy, we let y1 = 2,y2 = 2 be the eavesdropped output trajectory, and
xˆ0 = [1.5; 1.8] be a guess from the eavesdroppers. The system then denies this guess by stating that
for example ‖x0 − xˆ0‖> 0.5. To verify whether this deny is plausible, the eavesdroppers thus compute
pdf(YT |x0) and pdf(YT |x′0) with any value x′0 = [1; 1.2] satisfying ‖x′0− xˆ0‖> 0.5, and find pdf(YT |x0) ≤
e0.6pdf(YT |x′0). In this way, the system has gained plausible deniability measured by δ = 0.48 and  = 0.6.
On the other hand, we randomly choose four adjacent initial values x¯0 = [1.4; 1.7], x¯
′
0 = [1.6; 1.8], xˆ0 =
[1.5; 1.9], xˆ′0 = [1.3; 2]. The resulting distributions of y0,y1 under these initial values x¯0, x¯′0, xˆ0, xˆ′0 are
presented in Figures 1 and 2. From Figures 1 and 2, it can be seen that the resulting probabilities of
output trajectory YT at any set are similar. This thus can imply that the system in Case (b) preserves
the differential privacy of initial values.
Figure 1: Distributions of y0 under different initial values x¯0, x¯
′
0, xˆ0, xˆ
′
0.
Figure 2: Distributions of y1 under different initial values x¯0, x¯
′
0, xˆ0, xˆ
′
0.
In view of the previous analysis for Cases (a) and (b), we can see that neither the intrinsic initial-value
privacy implies the differential initial-value privacy, nor the differential initial-value privacy implies the
intrinsic initial-value privacy. Therefore, both privacy metrics in Definitions 1 and 2 are mutually neither
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inclusive nor exclusive. 
2.3 Related Works
Of relevance to our paper are recent works [15–17]. In [15], the considered linear dynamical systems take
the form
xt+1 = A xt + Bωt
yt = C xt + Dωt
zt = L xt
where zt is a signal to be estimated, and the problem is to design a filter
xˆt+1 = F xˆt + G yt
zˆt = H xˆt + K yt + νt
(7)
with filter output zˆt, for the purpose of obtaining an optimal mean squared error between zt and zˆt, while
preserving the differential privacy of system state trajectory XT = (xt)
T
t=0, with the initial state considered
in this paper as a particular case. Despite of this, we note that our framework can be extended to the
scenario where XT are sensitive, which will be explicitly addressed in Remark 5. On the other hand,
in [15], the eavesdropped information is a filter output trajectory ẐT = (zˆt)
T
t=0, that is different from
our paper where the eavesdroppers can directly measure system outputs. To address the desired privacy
concerns, [15] studies the differential privacy of a composite mapping ẐT = Mf (XT ) := M2 ◦M1(XT ), the
mapping YT = (IT+1 ⊗ C)XT + WT and the mapping ẐT = M2(YT ) is defined over the filter dynamics
(7). This is different mechanism compared to our mapping (4).
In [17] a cloud-based linear quadratic regulation problem is studied for systems of the form
xt+1 = A xt + B ut + νt
yt = C xt + ωt
where the outputs yt are transmitted to the cloud for an optimal control, having the form
x¯t+1 = F x¯t + G yt
ut = H x¯t .
The privacy issue of interest is to protect privacy of the state trajectory XT , against the eavesdroppers
having access to the transmitted information consisting of yt,ut by cyber attack. To address the state-
trajectory privacy, [17] studies the differential privacy of the mapping YT = My(XT ) := (IT+1⊗C)XT +
WT . Therefore, again this is different mechanism compared to our mapping (4).
In [16], the authors consider a control system
xt+1 = A xt + B (ut + νt)
yt = C xt + D (ut + νt) + ωt ,
where νt,ωt are injected input and measurement noise for privacy protection, and to achieve the desired
control objective, the control input ut is designed as a form
x¯t+1 = F x¯t + G yt
ut = H x¯t + L yt .
(8)
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The eavesdroppers having access to an output trajectory YT through cyber attack attempt to infer
control inputs ut and initial values x0. In this setting, [16] studies the differential privacy of a mapping
from ((ut)
T
t=0, x0) to YT over the xt-dynamics. Compared to our mapping (4), the considered mapping
in [16] is similar in the sense that both are established over the xt-dynamics, while is different in the sense
that there are N output trajectories and no control input in our mapping (4).
In addition to the previous distinctions, we note that this paper also studies privacy issues when an
infinite number of output trajectories are eavesdropped, while it is absent in [15–17]. This extra study
benefits us to understand whether the initial-value privacy can be preserved if the eavesdroppers have
obtained a large number of output trajectories.
3 Initial-Value Privacy of General Linear Systems
In this section, both intrinsic and differential initial-value privacy of systems (1) are analyzed. We first
present the following result on the equivalence of intrinsic initial-value privacy and unobservability.
Proposition 1 The system (1) preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy if and only if (A,C) is not ob-
servable, i.e., rank (Oob) < n.
Remark 3 Observability has been extensively studied in the fields of estimation [25] and feedback con-
trol [26]. In [16], for a linear control system the input observability is also explored to preserve differential
privacy of control inputs and initial states. In Proposition 1, the intrinsic initial-value privacy and observ-
ability are bridged for linear systems (1).
Next, the differential privacy of initial values for (1) is studied. As in [15], we define Q(w) := 1√
2pi
∫∞
w e
− v2
2 dv,
and κ(, δ) :=
Q−1(δ)+
√
(Q−1(δ))2+2
2 .
Theorem 1 Suppose that (VT ; WT ) are random variables according to (VT ; WT ) v N(0,ΣT ). Then the
dynamical system (1) preserves (, δ)-differential privacy of initial state under d-adjacency, with  > 0 and
0.5 > δ > 0, if
σm
([
HT Im(T+1)
]
ΣT
[
HT Im(T+1)
]>) ≥ d2N‖OT ‖2κ(, δ)2 . (9)
Remark 4 In Theorem 1, νt,ωt are assumed to admit Gaussian distributions. This renders the mapping
(4) to be a Gaussian mechanism [10, 15], resulting in the (, δ)-differential privacy. One may wonder if
assuming Laplacian noise νt,ωt would lead to a stronger (, 0)-differential privacy, as in [14]. However,
we note that the resulting mapping (4) is not a Laplace mechanism, because there is no guarantee that
HTVT + WT is still Laplacian, even if νt,ωt are Laplacian variables.
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Remark 5 Though only initial values of system (1) are treated as private information, we note that the
results in Theorem 1 can be extended to the case that all states xt are sensitive. For dynamical systems
(1), the outputs yk for all k ≥ t in YT contain the information of xt, rendering a mapping from xt and
YT−t as
YT−t = Mt(xt) := OT−txt + HT−tVT−t + WT−t .
By combining all Mt(xt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T together, one then can establish a mapping from the state trajectory
(xt)
T
t=0 to the output trajectory YT . For such a combined mapping, following the arguments in the proof
of Theorem 1, one then can establish (, δ)-differential privacy of the state trajectory (xt)
T
t=0 with some
 > 0 and 0.5 > δ > 0. In this way, our framework can be further applied to solve the problems in [15,17],
where the state trajectory is private information.
We note that given any covariance matrix ΣT > 0, there always exist  > 0 and 0.5 > δ > 0,
depending on the norm of extended observability matrix OT such that (9) is satisfied, yielding the (, δ)-
differential initial-value privacy. Thus, the (, δ)-differential initial-value privacy and the intrinsic initial-
value privacy are mutually independent, with the latter determined by the unobservability of systems (1),
i.e., rank (Oob) < n by Proposition 1. If the noise can be designed, then there always exists a sufficiently
large covariance matrix ΣT such that (9) holds for any privacy budgets ε > 0, 0.5 > δ > 0. To have a
better view of this, we consider a particular case that νt and ωt are i.i.d. random variables. The following
corollary can be easily derived by verifying the condition (9).
Corollary 1 Suppose νt and ωt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T are i.i.d. random variables according to νt v N(0, σ2νIn)
and ωt v N(0, σ2ωIm). Then for any  > 0, 0.5 > δ > 0, and all σν ≥ 0 and σω ≥ d
√
N‖OT ‖κ(, δ), the
dynamical system (1) preserves (, δ)-differential privacy of initial state under d-adjacency.
Remark 6 Though in Corollary 1 arbitrary (, δ)-differential privacy can be achieved by choosing a suffi-
ciently large σω, this doesn’t mean that the process noise νt does not contribute to the differential privacy.
In fact, simple calculations following the proof of Theorem 1 can lead to a less restrictive condition as
‖O>T (σ2νHTH>T + σ2ωIm)−1OT ‖≤
1
d2Nκ(, δ)2
,
from which it can be seen that σν also plays a role in achieving arbitrary differential privacy of initial
values.
Remark 7 If the considered systems take a time-varying form
xt+1 = At xt + νt
yt = Ct xt + ωt
(10)
where the state and output matrices At,Ct vary as t evolves, it can be easily verified that the claims in
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are still preserved by replacing the observability matrix Oob and the extended
observability matrix OT by their time-varying version Ô := [C
>
0 , A
>
0 C
>
1 , · · · , A>0 · · ·A>T−1C>T ]>.
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4 Intrinsic Initial-Value Privacy of Networked Linear Systems
The system (1) can also be understood from a network system perspective, e.g., [24]. Let xi,t be the i-th
entry of xt. If each xi,t is viewed as the dynamical state of a node, the matrix A would indicate a graph
of interactions among the nodes. If each entry of yt is viewed as the measurement of a sensor, then the
matrix C would indicate a graph of interactions between the nodes and the sensors.
In view of this, we consider a network consisting of n network nodes and m sensing nodes, leading to
a network node set V = {1, . . . , n} and a sensing node set VS = {s1, . . . , sm} 1, respectively. Define the
interaction graph G = (V,E) with edge set E ⊂ V×V, and the sensing graph GS = (V,VS,ES) with edge
set ES ⊂ V ×VS. Let A = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n and C = [cij ] ∈ Rm×n.
To this end, this section aims to study how topological effects affect the privacy analysis of the networked
system (1) with (A,C) being a configuration complying with the graphs G,GS, i.e., if aij = 0 for (j, i) /∈ E
and cij = 0 for (j, si) /∈ ES.
Remark 8 For the LTV systems (10), the corresponding network structure becomes time-varying, where
matrix At indicates a graph of interactions among the network nodes at time t and matrix Ct indicates a
graph of interactions between the network and sensing nodes at time t. Thus we define the time-varying
interaction graph Gt = (V,Et) with edge set Et ⊂ V × V, and the sensing graph GS,t = (V,VS,ES,t) with
edge set ES,t ⊂ V ×VS.
4.1 Intrinsic privacy of individual initial values
It is noted that in Definition 1 regarding intrinsic initial-value privacy, the initial state vector x0 is
considered as a whole, and we suppose that the eavesdroppers have no prior knowledge of any individual
initial values. In the following, we present several definitions that refine the notion in Definition 1 to
dynamical networked systems (1) by studying intrinsic privacy of individual initial values, i.e., xi,0, against
eavesdroppers having knowledge of the whole sensor measurements (i.e., yt) and initial values of some
network nodes. For convenience, we term the set of nodes whose initial values are prior knowledge to
eavesdroppers as a public disclosure set.
Definition 3 For any given configuration (A,C) complying with graphs G,GS, take i ∈ V and let P ⊂ V.
The networked system (1) preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i w.r.t. public disclosure set P
if for any initial state x0 ∈ Rn, there exists an x′0 = [x′1,0; . . . ;x′n,0] ∈ Rn such that xi,0 6= x′i,0, xj,0 = x′j,0
for all j ∈ P, and
pdf (YT |x0) = pdf
(
YT |x′0
)
. (11)
1To be distinguished with notations for nodes in the interaction graph G, we use si to denote the i-th sensing node whose
measurement is yi.
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Remark 9 The equality (11) indicates that even if the initial values of some nodes j ∈ P are public, the
initial value xi,0 cannot be identified from trajectories of yt, even with an infinite number of realizations
of the dynamic networked system (1).
Remark 10 If the eavesdroppers have no prior knowledge of any node initial states, the above definition
is also applicable with P = ∅. In this case, according to Proposition 1, the notion of intrinsic initial-value
privacy of node i is related to state variable unobservability of state xi,t, that is a dual notion of state
variable uncontrollability in [29].
Let l = |P| and P = {p1, . . . , pl} ⊂ V. Define P¯ := {p¯1, . . . , p¯n−l} = V\P. For convenience, we further
let EP = [ep1 , . . . , epl ] ∈ Rn×l and EP¯ = [ep¯1 , . . . , ep¯n−l ] ∈ Rn×(n−l), and Kobj be the j-the column of
matrix Oob.
Theorem 2 Let the dynamical networked system (1) be equipped with configuration (A,C) complying
with graphs G,GS. Let i ∈ V and P ⊂ V with i /∈ P. The following statements are equivalent.
a). The networked system (1) preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i w.r.t. P.
b). rank (OobEP¯) = rank ([K
ob
i1
, . . . ,Kobin−l−1 ]) with {i1, . . . , in−l−1} = V\(P ∪ {i}).
c). rank


Oob
E>P
e>i

 = rank
([
Oob
E>P
])
+ 1.
Remark 11 Recalling (2), it can be seen that each initial state xj,0 is multiplied by the j-th column of
the (extended) observability matrix. We term each j-th column of the observability matrix as a “feature”
vector of the corresponding node j, and the columns corresponding to nodes in public set P and unpublic
set P¯ as public and unpublic “feature” vectors, respectively. Then, the equivalence of statements a) and
b) demonstrates that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved if and only if its “feature”
vector can be expressed by a linear combination of the remainder unpublic “feature” vectors, i.e., the i-th
“feature” vector is encrypted by the remainder unpublic ones.
Remark 12 In Theorem 2, the equivalence of statements a) and c) demonstrates that the intrinsic initial-
value privacy of node i is preserved if and only if e>i does not belong to the P-extended observable subspace,
denoted by span
([
Oob
E>P
])
.
Remark 13 It is worth noting that the verification of statement c) can be simplified as
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c′). rank
([
Oob
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= rank (OobEP¯) + 1 .
This can be easily verified by using the following facts that
rank


Oob
E>P
e>i

 = rank
([
Oob
e>i
]
EP¯
)
+ rank (EP)
rank
([
Oob
E>P
])
= rank (OobEP¯) + rank (EP) .
In view of this, we occasionally use c′) to replace c) in Theorem 2 in the sequel.
In Theorem 2, explicit rank conditions are proposed to determine whether the intrinsic initial-value
privacy of individual nodes is preserved, with respect to any given public disclosure set P. On the other
hand, for a networked system, one may naturally ask what is the maximum allowable disclosure such that
there always exists at least one node whose initial-value privacy is preserved. To address this issue, the
network privacy index is introduced below.
Definition 4 The networked system (1) achieves level-l network privacy, if for any public disclosure set
P ⊂ V with |P|= l, there exists a node i ∈ V\P whose intrinsic initial-value privacy is preserved w.r.t. P.
The network privacy index of (1), denoted as Irp, is defined as the maximal value of l such that level-l
relative privacy is achieved.
Proposition 2 The network privacy index of networked system (1) is Irp = n− rank (Oob)− 1.
Remark 14 By Definition 4, the full initial value is not disclosed irrespective of which Irp nodes are
public. It is clear that a larger Irp means a stronger privacy-preservation ability of the networked system
(1). According to Proposition 2, this further implies that a networked system possesses a better privacy-
preservation ability, if the dimension of its unobservable subspace (i.e., n− rank (Oob)) is higher.
Example 2. We present an example to illustrate Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. Consider a networked
system (1) with (A,C) complying with the graphs G,GS in Fig. 3, consisting of 20 network nodes and 2
sensing nodes. Each edge of E,ES is assigned with the same weight 1.
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Figure 3: Network topologies (G,GS) with 20 network nodes (blue circles) and 2 sensing nodes (red circles).
The edges in E and ES are drawn in blue and red lines, respectively, where the lines without arrows denote
bidirectional edges.
Firstly, suppose the eavesdroppers have no prior knowledge of initial values of any nodes, i.e., P = ∅.
We observe that rank (Oob) = 17. According to Proposition 2, this indicates that the network privacy
index Irp = 2. Moreover, for all i ∈ V\{8, 18}, there holds
rank
([
Oob
e>i
])
= 18 .
According to Theorem 2, this indicates that the networked system preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy
of all i ∈ V\{8, 18}.
Let the public disclosure set P = {1, 2, 7}. Taking into account the intrinsic initial-value privacy of
individual nodes, we note that
rank
([
Oob
EP
])
= 19 , rank


Oob
EP
e>i

 = 20
for all i ∈ {3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17}. This verifies statement c) and thus indicates that the net-
worked system preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy of all nodes i ∈ {3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17},
even if the initial states of nodes 1, 2, 7 are public. 
4.2 Generic intrinsic initial-value privacy
In the previous subsection, the intrinsic initial-value privacy of individual nodes w.r.t. the public disclosure
set P of networked systems (1) is studied, and a network privacy index Irp is proposed to quantify the
privacy of networked system (1). In the following, we turn to study the effect of network structure (G,GS)
to the intrinsic privacy and the network privacy index. To be precise, we demonstrate that these properties
are indeed generic, i.e., are fulfilled for almost all edge weights under any network structure (G,GS).
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Theorem 3 Let P ⊂ V and i ∈ V. Then the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i w.r.t. P is generically
determined by the network topology. To be precise, exactly one of the following statements holds for any
non-trivial network structure (G,GS).
(i) The intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically, i.e., for almost all configurations
(A,C) complying with the network structure (G,GS).
(ii) The intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is lost generically, i.e., for almost all configurations
(A,C) complying with the network structure (G,GS).
Theorem 3 demonstrates that given any network structure (G,GS) and P ⊂ V, the intrinsic initial-value
privacy of node i is either preserved or lost generically. We note that if there exists a configuration (A,C)
complying with (G,GS) such that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved (or lost), there
is no guarantee that such property is preserved (or lost) generically. This is different from other common
generic properties like structural controllability [34], for which if there exists a configuration such that a
linear system is controllable, then it must be controllable for almost all configurations, i.e., structurally
controllable. To have a better view of this, the following examples are formulated.
Example 3. Consider the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node 1 with (A,C) complying with the network
structure in Fig. 4. Let T = 2, and the system output trajectory YT is given by (2) with
OT =

c11 0 c13
0 c11a12 0
c11a12a21 0 c11a12a23
 .
It is clear that OT is full-rank for almost all configurations (A,C) complying with Fig. 4. Thus, for
any x0,x
′
0 with x1,0 6= x′1,0, OTx0 6= OTx′0 and thus pdf (YT |x0) 6= pdf (YT |x′0) hold for almost all
configurations (A,C) complying with Fig. 4. According to Definition 3, this indicates that the intrinsic
initial-value privacy of node 1 is lost generically.
Figure 4: Network topologies (G,GS) with 3 network nodes (blue circles) and 1 sensing nodes (red circles).
The line without arrow denotes a bidirectional edge.
However, by letting the configuration (A,C) be such that c11a23 = c13a21, simple calculations show
that pdf (YT |x0) = pdf (YT |x′0) holds for any x0,x′0 with x1,0 6= x′1,0 and c13(x′3,0−x3,0) = c11(x1,0−x′1,0).
According to Definition 3, this indicates that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node 1 is preserved under
the configuration (A,C) satisfying c11a23 = c13a21.
Thus, even if there exists a configuration such that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is
preserved, this property may still be lost generically. This validates the statement (i) of Theorem 3. 
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Example 4. Consider the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node 4 under the network structure in Fig. 5.
Let T = 3, and the output trajectory YT is given by (2) with
OT =

c11 0 c13 0
c11a11 c11a12 0 c11a14
c11a
2
11 c11a12(a11 + a22) c11a12a23 c11a11a14
c11a
3
11 ∗ ? c11a211a14

with ∗ = c11a12(a211 + a11a22 + a222) and ? = c11a12a23(a11 + a22). Simple calculations then can show that
pdf (YT |x0) = pdf (YT |x′0) holds for any x0,x′0 with x4,0 6= x′4,0 and x′j,0 = xj,0 + ηj for j = 1, 2, 3, where
ηj ’s satisfy
c11η1 + c13η3 = 0
a11η1 + a12η2 = a14(x4,0 − x′4,0)
a22η2 + a23η3 = 0 .
(12)
It is clear that the above matrix equations (12) have a solution for almost all configurations (A,C)
complying with Fig. 5, which, by Definition 3, indicates that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node 4
is preserved generically.
Figure 5: Network topologies (G,GS) with 4 network nodes (blue circles) and 1 sensing nodes (red circles).
However, by letting the configuration (A,C) be such that c13a11a22 + c11a12a23 = 0 and c11a14a22 6= 0,
it can be seen that there exists no ηj ’s such that the matrix equations (12) holds for any x4,0 6= x′4,0, and
(a22 + a11)y1 − a11a22y0 − y2 = c11a14a22x4,0 + g(WT ,VT )
with g(WT ,VT ) being some function of noise vectors WT ,VT . This immediately yields pdf (YT |x0) 6=
pdf (YT |x′0) for all x0,x′0 with x4,0 6= x′4,0. By Definition 3, this indicates that the intrinsic initial-value
privacy of node 4 is lost under the configuration (A,C) satisfying c13a11a22+c11a12a23 = 0 and c11a14a22 6=
0.
Thus, even if there exists a configuration such that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is lost,
such property may still be preserved generically. This is consistent with the statement (ii) of Theorem 3.

Denote the maximal rank of OobEP¯ over the matrix pairs (A,C) that comply with the network structure
(G,GS) as n
ob
P . By Lemma 2 in Appendix E, it is noted that rank (OobEP¯) = n
ob
P holds for almost
all configurations (A,C) complying with the network structure (G,GS). We now present a practical
verification approach of the intrinsic initial-value privacy of a node i over the network structure (G,GS).
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Let the entries of A and C be generated independently and randomly according to the uniform distri-
bution over the interval [0, 1], and complying with the structure (G,GS). We introduce the following three
conditions:
(C1) rank
([
Oob
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= nobP + 1.
(C2) rank
(
[Kobi1 ,K
ob
i2
, . . . ,Kobin−l−1 ]
)
= nobP with {i1, i2, . . . , in−l−1} = V\(P ∪ {i}).
(C3) rank


Oob
E>P
e>i

 = nobP + l + 1.
Denote A,C as one realized sample from this randomization, from which we define the following event
E(A,C) := {(A,C) : either (C1), (C2) or (C3) holds}.
We present the following result.
Theorem 4 The following statements hold.
(i) If the event E(A,C) occurs, then we know with certainty (in the deterministic sense) that intrinsic
initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically over the network structure (G,GS).
(ii) If intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically, then E(A,C) must occur with prob-
ability one.
Theorem 4 indeed indicates a two-step approach to verify whether the intrinsic initial-value privacy of
individual nodes is preserved generically. Given any set P ⊂ V and node i ∈ V, the first step is to compute
the maximal rank nobP of OobEP¯. In practice, since rank (OobEP¯) = n
ob
P holds for almost all configurations
(A,C) complying with the network structure (G,GS), the value n
ob
P can be obtained by computing the
maximal rank (OobEP¯) under a few independently and randomly generated configurations (A,C). The
second step is to verify whether the event E(A,C) occurs under the independently and randomly generated
configurations. If the event E(A,C) occurs, one then conclude that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node
i is preserved generically. Otherwise, if the event E(A,C) does not occur, the intrinsic initial-value privacy
of node i is lost generically by Theorem 3.
Remark 15 When P = ∅, according to Theorem 2, the generic intrinsic initial-value privacy of node
i indicates that the node state xi,t is unobservable for almost all configurations (A,C) complying with
(G,GS), i.e., structurally unobservable, that is an extension of the dual notion to structural state variable
controllability [29], and structural observability [30, 32].
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Similar to Theorem 3, the network privacy index is also generically determined by the network structure
(G,GS).
Theorem 5 The network privacy index is generically determined by the network topology. Namely, for
almost all configurations (A,C) complying with the network structure (G,GS), the network privacy index
Irp = n− ngob − 1 with ngob given by the maximal rank of the observability matrix Oob.
Remark 16 By the proof of Theorem 5, rank (Oob) = n
g
ob holds for almost all configurations (A,C)
complying with (G,GS). According to [31] and the duality principle between controllability and observability,
the ngob indeed is given by the maximal number of edges in the set of stem-cycle disjoint graphs [29, 31].
Remark 17 We remark that the results in Theorems 2–5 and Proposition 2 can be easily extended to
time-varying networked systems (10) under time-varying graphs (Gt,GS,t), by replacing the observability
matrix Oob by its time-varying version Ô.
Example 5. Now an example is presented to illustrate Theorems 4-5. We consider a networked system
(1) with (A,C) complying with the graphs G,GS in Fig. 6, consisting of 12 network nodes and 2 sensing
nodes.
Figure 6: Network topologies (G,GS) with 12 network nodes (blue circles) and 2 sensing nodes (red circles).
The lines without arrows denote bidirectional edges.
We choose five configurations (A,C) with the entries generated independently and randomly according
to the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1], and complying with the graph in Fig. 6. Under these
configurations, we check the corresponding ranks of matrix Oob, and find that the maximal rank is n
g
ob = 10.
According to Theorem 5, the network privacy index is Irp = 1, for almost all configurations complying
with the graph in Fig. 6. Then, for each i ∈ V by fixing all edge weights as 1, it can be verified that
rank
([
Oob
e>i
])
= 11 , for i = 3, 6, 7, 12.
Using Theorem 4, this indicates that the network system preserves the intrinsic initial-value privacy of
nodes 3, 6, 7, 12 for almost all configurations (A,C) complying with the graph in Fig. 6.
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Let the public disclosure set P = {3, 6}. Under the previously generated five configurations (A,C), we
check the corresponding ranks of matrix OobEP¯, and find that the maximal rank is n
ob
P = 9. Then fix all
edge weights as 1 in Fig. 6, and we can obtain
rank
([
OobEP¯
e>i EP¯
])
= 10 , for i = 7, 12.
By Theorem 4, this indicates that the network system preserves the intrinsic initial-value privacy of nodes
7, 12 for almost all configurations (A,C) complying with the graph in Fig. 6, under the the public disclosure
set P = {3, 6}.
Furthermore, let P = {3, 7}. Similarly, we check the corresponding ranks of matrix OobEP¯ under the
previously generated five configurations (A,C), and can find that nobP = 10, i.e., OobEP¯ is full-column-rank
for almost all configurations (A,C) complying with the graph in Fig. 6. This implies that for all i, there
is no configuration (A,C) such that
rank
([
OobEP¯
e>i EP¯
])
= 11 .
Thus, by Theorem 4 the intrinsic initial-value privacy of all nodes is generically lost. 
Remark 18 We remark that for a large-scale system (1), it is generally difficult to determine the generic
intrinsic initial-value privacy of individual nodes, due to the high computational complexity to compute
the maximal rank of OobEP¯ and verify the rank conditions in (C1)-(C3). A possible solution is to find
topological conditions as in [33,34]. However, the extension of ideas in [33,34] to our settings is nontrivial,
particularly in the presence of a public disclosure set P. This will be further explored in future works.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the intrinsic initial-value privacy and differential initial-value privacy of
linear dynamical systems with random process and measurement noises. We proved that the intrinsic
initial-value privacy is equivalent to unobservability, while the differential initial-value privacy can be
achieved for a privacy budget depending on an extended observability matrix of the system and the
covariance of the noises. Next, by regarding the considered linear system as a network system, we proposed
necessary and sufficient conditions on the intrinsic initial-value privacy of individual nodes, in the presence
of some nodes whose initial-value privacy is public. A quantitative network privacy index was also proposed
using the largest number of arbitrary public nodes such that the whole initial values are not fully exposed.
In addition, we showed that both the intrinsic initial-value privacy and the network privacy index are
generically determined by the network structure. In future works, topological conditions (see e.g. [33,34])
will be explored for generic intrinsic initial-value privacy of individual nodes, and the considered privacy
metrics will be utilized to develop privacy-preservation approaches for linear dynamical systems.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Sufficiency. If rank (Oob) < n, then rank (OT ) < n and for all η ∈ ker(OT ), we have
pdf (YT |x0) = pdf (YT |x0 + η) . (13)
This, according to Definition 1, completes the sufficiency.
Necessity. To show the necessity part, the contradiction method is used. With the system (1) preserving
intrinsic initial-value privacy, we suppose that rank (OT ) = n. This implies that the mapping M(·) is
invertible, i.e.,
x0 = M
−1(YT ) := (O>TOT )
−1O>T (YT −HTVT −WT ) .
It is clear that x0 is identifiable from YT , i.e., the initial value x0 of the system (1) is not private. This
contradicts with the fact that the system (1) preserves intrinsic initial-value privacy. Therefore, it can be
concluded that rank (OT ) < n. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Let ViT ,W
i
T be the process and measurement noise vectors, respectively for the i-th implementation.
Define zi := HTV
i
T + W
i
T and z := [z
1; z2; . . . ; zN ]. Hence, z v N(0, IN ⊗ Σ) with
Σ :=
[
HT Im(T+1)
]
ΣT
[
HT Im(T+1)
]>
.
As in [15], with the mapping MN defined in (4), for any R ⊂ range(MN ) and  > 0, we have
P(MN (x0) ∈ R) = P((1N ⊗OT )x0 + z ∈ R)
a)
= (2pi)−
Nm(T+1)
2 det(Σ)−
N
2
∫
R
exp
(
− 1
2
‖(IN ⊗ Σ− 12 )(u− (1N ⊗OT )x0)‖2
)
du
b)
= exp()P(MN (x′0) ∈ R) + (2pi)−
Nm (T+1)
2 det(Σ)−
N
2
∫
R
exp
(
−1
2
‖(IN ⊗ Σ− 12 )(u− (1N ⊗OT )x0)‖2
)
·
·
(
1− exp
(
− (u− (1N ⊗OT )x0)>(1N ⊗ Σ−1OT )x˜0 − N2 x˜>0 O>T Σ−1OT x˜0
))
du
c)
≤ exp()P(MN (x′0) ∈ R) + (2pi)−
Nm (T+1)
2
∫
RNm(T+1)
1
vT (1N⊗Σ−
1
2OT )x˜0≥−N2 ‖Σ−
1
2OT x˜0‖2
exp (− ‖v‖
2
2
) dv
d)
≤ exp()P(MN (x′0) ∈ R) + P
(
x˜>0
(
1>N ⊗O>T Σ−
1
2
)
v ≥ − N2 ‖Σ−
1
2OT x˜0‖2
)
where a) is obtained by setting u = (1>N ⊗OT )x0 + z, b) is obtained by adding and subtracting the term
exp()P(MN (x′0) ∈ R), and setting x˜0 = x0 − x′0, c) is obtained by choosing R = RNm(T+1) and setting
v = (IN ⊗ Σ− 12 )[u − (1N ⊗ OT )x0] with v v N(0, INm(T+1)), and d) is derived by using the fact that
x˜>0
(
1>N ⊗O>T Σ−
1
2
)
v v N(0, N‖Σ− 12OT x˜0‖2). It is noted that
P
(
x˜>0
(
1>N ⊗O>T Σ−
1
2
)
v ≥ − N2 ‖Σ−
1
2OT x˜0‖2
)
≤ P
(
Z ≥ 
√
σm(Σ)
d
√
N‖OT ‖ −
d
√
N‖OT ‖
2
√
σm(Σ)
)
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with Z v N(0, 1).
Thus, it can be concluded that the (, δ)-differential privacy is preserved if , δ satisfy
δ ≥ Q
(

√
σm(Σ)
d
√
N‖OT ‖
− d
√
N‖OT ‖
2
√
σm(Σ)
)
. (14)
With Q(w) being a strictly decreasing smooth function, it is clear that (14) is equivalent to
σm(Σ)
d
√
N‖OT ‖
− Q−1(δ)
√
σm(Σ)− d
√
N‖OT ‖
2
≥ 0 ,
which is fulfilled if (9) holds. The proof is thus completed.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Let Kj be the j-the column of matrix OT . Fundamental to the proof is the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1 Statement b) and c) in Theorem 2 are respectively equivalent to the following b†) and c†).
b†). rank ([Kp¯1 , . . . ,Kp¯n−l ]) = rank ([Ki1 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]) with {i1, . . . , in−l−1} = V\(P ∪ {i}).
c†). rank
([
OT
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= rank (OTEP¯) + 1.
Proof. We observe that OT = QTOob with QT ∈ Rm(T+1)×mn being full-column-rank, which yields
rank (OTEP¯) = rank (OobEP¯) . (15)
Namely,
rank ([Kp¯1 , . . . ,Kp¯n−l ]) = rank ([K
ob
p¯1 , . . . ,K
ob
p¯n−l ]) .
Similarly, it can be verified that rank ([Ki1 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]) = rank ([K
ob
i1
, . . . ,Kobin−l−1 ]). Therefore, the
statements b) and b†) are equivalent.
To show the equivalence between statements c) and c†), we observe that
rank
([
Oob
E>P
])
= rank
([
OT
E>P
])
= rank (OTEP¯) + l
rank


Oob
E>P
e>i

 = rank


OT
E>P
e>i


= rank
([
OT
e>i
]
EP¯
)
+ l .
This thus establishes the equivalence between statements c) and c†). 
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With the above lemma in mind, we now proceed to show a)⇐⇒ b†) and b)⇐⇒ c†), which in turn will
complete the proof.
a) =⇒ b†). Given any node i ∈ V, we now proceed to show, if the initial-value privacy of node i is preserved
w.r.t. P, Ki ∈ range([Ki1 ,Ki2 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]). The contradiction method is used by supposing there exists
no vector Γ ∈ Rn−l−1 such that [Ki1 ,Ki2 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]Γ = Ki. This, in turn, implies there exists a vector
Di ∈ Rm(T+1) such that D>i Ki 6= 0 and D>i Kij = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n − l − 1. Thus, given any initial
condition x0 = [x1,0; . . . ;xn,0], we have
D>i YT =
∑
j∈P
D>i Kjxj,0 + D
>
i Kixi,0 + D
>
i (HTVT + WT ) ,
which implies
xi,0 = (D
>
i Ki)
−1D>i YT −
∑
j∈P
D>i Kjxj,0
−(D>i Ki)−1D>i HTVT − (D>i Ki)−1D>i WT .
It is clear that the initial condition xi,0 of node i is identifiable for system (1) w.r.t. P, which contradicts
with the fact that xi,0 is private. Therefore, we conclude that Ki ∈ range([Ki1 ,Ki2 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]), i.e., a)
implies b′).
b†) =⇒ a). Clearly, if
rank ([Ki,Ki1 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]) = rank ([Ki1 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]) ,
then there exists a vector Γ = [γ1; . . . ; γn−l−1] such that Ki =
n−l−1∑
j=1
γjKij . Given any x0 = [x1,0; . . . ;xn,0]
and x′0 = [x′1,0; . . . ;x′n,0] with xi,0 6= x′i(0), xj,0 = x′j,0 for j ∈ P, and x′ij ,0, j = 1, . . . , n− l − 1 satisfying
x′ij ,0 = xij ,0 + γj(xi,0 − x′i,0) ,
we can obtain
YT =
n∑
j=1
Kjxj,0 + HTVT + WT
=
∑
j∈P
Kjxj,0 + Kixi,0 +
n−l−1∑
j=1
Kijxij ,0 + HTVT + WT
=
∑
j∈P
Kjx
′
j,0 + Kix
′
i,0 +
n−l−1∑
j=1
γjKij (xi,0 − x′i,0) +
n−l−1∑
j=1
Kijx
′
ij ,0
−
n−l−1∑
j=1
Kijγj(xi,0 − x′i,0) + HTVT + WT
=
n∑
j=1
Kjx
′
j,0 + HTVT + WT .
Thus, given any nonzero ηi, we let ηj = 0 for all j ∈ P and ηij = γjηi for all j = 1, . . . , n− l − 1, we have
pdf (YT |x0) = pdf (YT |x0 + η) (16)
with η := col(η1, . . . , ηn). This, according to Definition 3, proves b
†) =⇒ a).
b†)⇐⇒ c†). The equivalence between b†) and c†) can be easily inferred by using the facts that
rank
([
OT
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= rank
([
Ki Ki1 . . . Kin−l−1
1 0 · · · 0
])
= rank
(
[Ki1 , . . . ,Kin−l−1 ]
)
+ 1 .
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D Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is completed if the following two statements are proved.
(i) Given any P ⊂ V with |P|= n− rank (Oob)− 1, there exists a node whose initial value is private.
(ii) There exists a set P ⊂ V with |P|= n−rank (Oob) such that initial values of all nodes are identifiable.
Proof of part (i). Given any P ⊂ V with |P|:= l = n − rank (Oob) − 1, it is clear that the matrix
[Kobp¯1 ,K
ob
p¯2 , . . . ,K
ob
p¯n−l ] is not full-column-rank, which indicates there exits an i = pj ∈ {p¯1, p¯2, . . . , p¯n−l}
such that
Kobi ∈ range([Kobp¯1 , . . . ,Kobp¯j−1 ,Kobp¯j+1 , . . . ,Kobp¯n−l ]) .
According to Theorem 2, this yields that the initial value of node i is private.
Proof of part (ii). Let r = rank (Oob) and l = n − r. Then, select p¯j ∈ V, j = 1, . . . , r such that
rank ([Kobp¯1 ,K
ob
p¯2 , . . . ,K
ob
p¯r ]) = r. Thus let P = V\{p¯1, p¯2, . . . , p¯r}. According to Theorem 2, it can be
concluded that the initial values of all nodes i ∈ {p¯1, p¯2, . . . , p¯r} = V\P are identifiable.
In summary of the previous analysis, we conclude that Irp = n− rank (Oob)− 1 for system (1).
E Proof of Theorem 3
To ease the subsequent analysis, we collect all edge weights aij , cij in a configuration vector θ ∈ RN with
N being the total number of edges in (G,GS). In this way, all matrices A,C are indeed functions of θ,
and so is the resulting observability matrix Oob.
Instrumental to the proof is the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists a nobP ≤ n− l such that
rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) = n
ob
P , for almost all θ ∈ RN (17)
rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) ≤ nobP , for all θ ∈ RN . (18)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is to find the maximal value of rank(Φ(θ)) with Φ(θ) := Oob(θ)EP¯. Let
α¯j(θ) : RN → R, j = 1, . . . , n− l be such that
det
(
sI− Φ(θ)>Φ(θ)
)
=
n−l∑
j=1
α¯j(θ)s
j−1 + sn−l .
We run the following recursive algorithm from k = 1 until nobP is found.
Step k: Check whether there exists θ′ ∈ RN such that α¯k(θ′) 6= 0. If so, using the fact that analytic
functions that are not identically zero vanish only on a zero-measure set, we can conclude that α¯k(θ) 6= 0
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holds for almost all θ ∈ RN . This, together with the fact that α¯j(θ) = 0 for all j ≤ k − 1 and all θ ∈ RN ,
indicates that (17) and (18) hold with nobP = n − l − k + 1. Otherwise, if for all θ ∈ RN , α¯k(θ) = 0, we
then proceed to Step k + 1.
If at the n− l-th recursion of the above algorithm, we still cannot find a θ ∈ RN such that α¯n−l(θ) 6= 0,
we then can conclude that nobP = 0. 
With this lemma, we now proceed to prove the theorem. Let Θ1 ⊆ RN be a set of configuration vector θ
such that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved for all θ ∈ Θ1 and lost for all θ ∈ RN\Θ1.
It is clear that the proof is done if we show that either Θ1 or RN\Θ1 is zero-measure. To prove it, we use
the contradiction method, and assume that there exists a nonzero-measure set Θ1 ∈ RN of configuration
vector θ such that
(P1) the set RN\Θ1 is nonzero-measure, and
(P2) the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved only for θ ∈ Θ1 under (G,GS), and
(P3) the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is lost for θ ∈ RN\Θ1 under (G,GS).
Then, according to Theorem 2 and Remark 13, it can be inferred that
(P2)⇐⇒ rank
[
Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
]
= rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) + 1 , for all θ ∈ Θ1 .
Let αj(θ) : RN → R, j = 1, . . . , n be such that
det
sI− [Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
]> [
Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
] = n−l∑
j=1
αj(θ)s
j−1 + sn−l .
By Lemma 2, there exists a nonzero-measure set Θob ⊆ RN such that the set RN\Θob is zero-measure,
and for all θ ∈ Θob, rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) = nobP . Besides, it is clear that, for all θ ∈ RN
rank
([
Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
])
≤ rank (OT (θ)EP¯) + 1 . (19)
Since Θ1 is nonzero-measure and RN\Θob is zero-measure, we have Θ1 ∩ Θob 6= ∅. Thus letting θ∗ ∈
Θ1 ∩Θob yields that rank (Oob(θ∗)EP¯) = nobP and
rank
[
Oob(θ
∗)EP¯
e>i EP¯
]
= rank (Oob(θ
∗)EP¯) + 1
= nobP + 1 .
This then implies αnuo(θ
∗) 6= 0 with nuo = n− l−nobP . Note that analytic functions that are not identically
zero vanish only on a zero-measure set. This indicates that there is a nonzero-measure set Θ2 ⊆ RN of
configuration vector θ such that
(P4) the set RN\Θ2 is zero-measure, and
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(P5) the inequality αnuo(θ) 6= 0 holds for all θ ∈ Θ2.
Thus, for all θ ∈ Θob ∩Θ2, we have
rank
([
Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
])
≥ nobP + 1 = rank (OT (θ)EP¯) + 1 ,
which, together with (19), yields
rank
([
Oob(θ)EP¯
e>i EP¯
])
= rank (OT (θ)EP¯) + 1
for all θ ∈ Θob ∩ Θ2. According to Theorem 2 and Remark 13, this implies that the intrinsic initial-
value privacy of node i is preserved for all configuration vector θ ∈ Θob ∩Θ2. Then by (P2) and (P3), it
immediately follows that (RN\Θ1) ⊆ RN\(Θob∩Θ2), where the set RN\(Θob∩Θ2) = (RN\Θob)∪(RN\Θ2) is
zero-measure. This indicates that RN\Θ1 is zero-measure, which contradicts with (P1), and thus completes
the proof.
F Proof of Theorem 4
Recalling Theorem 2 and Remark 13, we can easily see that (C1), (C2) and (C3) are equivalent. Thus,
the proof is done if the following two statements are proved.
(S1) If the condition (C1) holds, then the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically.
(S2) If the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically, then the condition (C1) holds
for almost all configurations complying with G,GP.
Proof of (S1). By the condition (C1), there exists a θ∗ ∈ RN such that
rank
([
Oob(θ
∗)
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= nobP + 1 .
Following the notations in section E, we can obtain
αnuo(θ
∗) 6= 0
with nuo = n− l−nobP . Therefore, according to the standard arguments, there exists a nonzero-measure set
Θ3 ⊆ RN such that the set RN\Θ3 is zero-measure, and the inequality αnuo(θ) 6= 0 holds for all θ ∈ Θ3.
This yields
rank
([
Oob(θ)
e>i
]
EP¯
)
≥ nobP + 1 , for all θ ∈ Θ3 .
Therefore, with (18) we have
rank
([
Oob(θ)
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= nobP + 1 (20)
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for all θ ∈ Θ3. Since rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) = nobP for all θ ∈ Θob with RN\Θob being zero-measure by Lemma
2, we thus obtain
rank
([
Oob(θ)
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) + 1 (21)
for all θ ∈ Θ3 ∩Θob. By Theorem 2 and Remark 13, this implies that the intrinsic initial-value privacy of
node i is preserved for all configurations θ ∈ Θ3 ∩ Θob. Note that RN\(Θ3 ∩ Θob) = RN\Θ3 ∪ RN\Θob is
zero-measure, which proves (S1).
Proof of (S2). Suppose the intrinsic initial-value privacy of node i is preserved generically. By Theorem
2 and Remark 13, this implies there exists a nonzero-measure set Θ4 ⊆ RN such that the set RN\Θ4 is
zero-measure, and for all θ ∈ Θ4, (21) holds.
Recalling the fact that rank (Oob(θ)EP¯) = n
ob
P for all θ ∈ Θob, we have
rank
([
Oob(θ)
e>i
]
EP¯
)
= nobP + 1 (22)
for all θ ∈ Θob ∩Θ4, where RN\(Θob ∩Θ4) is zero-measure. This thus proves (S2).
G Proof of Theorem 5
Let αˆj(θ) : RN → R, j = 1, . . . , n be such that
det
(
sI−Oob(θ)>Oob(θ)
)
=
n∑
j=1
αˆj(θ)s
j−1 + sn .
Since the maximal rank of Oob(θ) is n
g
ob, it immediately follows that there exists a θ
∗ ∈ RN such that
αˆn+1−ngob(θ
∗) 6= 0, and αˆj(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ RN and j ≤ n − ngob. Note that analytic functions that are
not identically zero vanish only on a zero-measure set. This indicates that there is a nonzero-measure
set Θ5 ⊆ RN of configuration vector θ such that the set RN\Θ5 is zero-measure, and the inequality
αˆn+1−ngob(θ) 6= 0 holds for all θ ∈ Θ5. Thus, we have rank (Oob(θ)) = n
g
ob holds for all θ ∈ Θ5. Recalling
that RN\Θ5 is zero-measure, this indeed proves that rank (Oob(θ)) = ngob holds for almost all θ ∈ RN .
With this in mind, we further combine with Proposition 2 and find that for all configuration θ ∈ Θ5,
the resulting network privacy index Irp = n − ngob − 1. Recalling that RN\Θ5 is zero-measure, one then
can conclude that the network privacy index Irp = n−ngob− 1 holds for almost all configurations θ ∈ RN .
This completes the proof.
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